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Competition Law in Kenya: The 2026 Outlook

Merger control, dominance, buyer power and the new regional overlay, explained for businesses and investors. Three regimes can now apply to one Kenya-touching deal: the Competition Authority of Kenya, the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission and the East African Community Competition Authority. This guide sets out when each bites, what it costs and how to stay on the right side of all three.

10 chaptersAbout 25 minutes
Primary sourcesCompetition Act 2010, CAK guidelines, COMESA and EAC rules
AuthorClay Odari, Lead Counsel
Last reviewed24 October 2026
Watch The Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026 is not yet law. It awaits the Committee of the Whole House, tentatively listed for 3 November 2026.
Chapter I

Why it matters now

Kenya has moved from a quiet competition regime to one of the more active in the region. The Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK), established by the Competition Act No. 12 of 2010, now combines a high volume of merger review with contested enforcement, and it does so alongside two regional merger regimes that both became stricter in late 2025.

128
Merger-related applications received by CAK in 2024/25, up from 107
KES 1.44bn
Financial penalties imposed in the same year
61%
Share of financial-sector complaints aimed at digital lenders and microfinance institutions, up from 34%
Source: CAK Annual Report and Financial Statements 2024/25 (published July 2026). The 128 applications include full mergers, COMESA mergers, exclusions, non-merger determinations and advisory opinions.

The exposure is not abstract. In July 2024 CAK fined Sika International AG and LSF11 Skyscraper Holdco about KES 17.5 million for implementing a global merger through their Kenyan subsidiaries without approval. It fined Directline Assurance KES 85 million for abuse of buyer power against small motor repairers. Both are covered below.

The perimeter is also widening: a pending amendment bill targets digital platforms below the traditional dominance threshold (Chapter VII), COMESA’s 2025 Regulations introduced a stricter, fully suspensory regime, and the EAC’s own authority began mandatory cross-border merger review on 1 November 2025 (Chapter VI).

Chapter II

The Act at a glance

The Competition Act No. 12 of 2010 is the primary statute. It created CAK as the enforcement body and the Competition Tribunal as the specialist appeal forum. Its prohibitions fall into three groups, with a separate consumer protection part enforced by the same Authority.

Section 21

Restrictive trade practices

Agreements, decisions and concerted practices that prevent, distort or lessen competition in Kenya.

Sections 23, 24 and 24A

Dominance and buyer power

Abuse of a dominant position as a seller, and abuse of superior bargaining strength as a buyer.

Sections 41 and 42

Merger control

A suspensory regime: a notifiable merger may not be implemented before CAK approves it.

CAK also runs a Leniency Programme for cartel conduct and applies Consolidated Administrative Remedies and Settlement Guidelines when setting penalties and settling cases (Chapter IX). Consumer protection under Part VI is covered in Chapter VIII.

Chapter III

Restrictive trade practices

Section 21(1) prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, distortion or lessening of competition in Kenya. The listed conduct includes:

  • fixing prices or other trading conditions, directly or indirectly;
  • dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, areas or goods;
  • collusive tendering and bid rigging;
  • limiting or controlling production, markets, technical development or investment.

Horizontal arrangements between competitors attract the closest scrutiny and the heaviest sanctions. Vertical restraints in distribution, franchise and supply agreements can also fall within section 21 where they have an anti-competitive object or effect, and are generally assessed on their effects.

Section 21 is a standing compliance issue, not a deal issue. Distribution networks, joint ventures, trade association meetings and industry benchmarking all carry it, every day.

Clay Odari, Lead Counsel
Chapter IV

Dominance and buyer power

Section 23 sets the test for dominance in a Kenyan market:

Market sharePosition under section 23
50% or moreDominant
40% to under 50%Dominant unless it shows it does not have market power
Under 40%Dominant only if it has market power

Section 24 prohibits abuse of a dominant position. The familiar categories, such as excessive or predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, tying and refusal to supply, are assessed on the facts of the market.

Enforcement in practice

In July 2026 CAK dismissed and closed Airtel’s complaint that Safaricom’s promotional voice tariffs (“Ofa Moto” and “Tunukiwa”), priced from KES 0.10 a minute, were predatory. As reported, CAK found the promotions kept within the 90-day limit on promotional pricing, with a three-month gap between them. For dominant firms in regulated sectors the lesson is that compliance with sector pricing rules can weigh heavily. CAK’s determination has not been published; this account is drawn from press reports.

Abuse of buyer power

Section 24A, unusual among peer regimes, prohibits abuse of buyer power by an undertaking with superior bargaining strength over its suppliers, whether or not it is dominant as a seller. Listed conduct includes delayed payment to suppliers without justification, unilateral termination or threats of termination, refusal to receive goods without justification, and transferring commercial costs and risks to suppliers.

Case: Directline Assurance, December 2025

On 3 December 2025 CAK fined Directline Assurance KES 85 million for persistently delaying payment to contracted motor repairers despite repeated reminders, ordered it to pay the arrears and required its supplier contracts to provide for interest on late payment. Any business that relies on smaller suppliers or contractors, dominant or not, should read its payment terms against section 24A.

Chapter V

Merger control in Kenya

Section 41 defines a merger widely: the direct or indirect acquisition or establishment of control over the whole or part of another undertaking’s business, which captures share and asset deals and full-function joint ventures. Under section 42 a merger that must be notified may not be implemented until CAK approves it.

Notification thresholds
Test (Competition (General) Rules 2019)When a filing is required
GeneralCombined Kenyan turnover or assets of at least KES 1 billion, and a target with turnover or assets above KES 500 million
Large acquirerAcquirer above KES 10 billion, where the parties are in the same market or vertically integrated (unless the COMESA thresholds are met)
Carbon-based mineralsValue of reserves, rights and associated exploration assets above KES 10 billion
Exclusion bandCombined KES 500 million to KES 1 billion: apply to CAK for exclusion. Below KES 500 million: excluded

Older CAK guidelines quoted a KES 100 million target test and a separate healthcare threshold. They have been overtaken by the binding 2019 Rules, so check any older client alert against the table above. Where the parties also meet the COMESA thresholds, a Kenyan filing is still required if two-thirds or more of their combined turnover or assets is in Kenya.

CAK filing fees
Combined turnover or assetsFee
KES 500 million to KES 1 billion (exclusion application)No fee
Above KES 1 billion up to KES 10 billionKES 1,000,000
Above KES 10 billion up to KES 50 billionKES 2,000,000
Above KES 50 billionKES 4,000,000
How long CAK takes
StepTime
Decision on a complete notification60 days
Request for more informationWithin 30 days of notification; the 60 days then run from receipt
Decision after a hearing conference30 days after the conference
Application for exclusion14 days
Determination that a deal is not a merger10 days
Advisory opinion10 days

Because the regime is suspensory, no integration step may be taken in Kenya before approval, even where the deal has closed elsewhere. Transaction documents should make Kenyan clearance a condition precedent, or carve the Kenyan business out of closing until it arrives.

Penalties for implementing without approval

Implementing a merger without the required approval is an offence under section 42(5), punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine of up to KES 10 million, or both. Section 36(d) separately allows CAK to impose a financial penalty of up to 10% of the preceding year’s gross annual turnover in Kenya. CAK’s Consolidated Administrative Remedies and Settlement Guidelines set out how penalties are calculated, with aggravating factors (impact, duration, repetition) and mitigating ones (cooperation, a first offence).

Case: Sika and LSF11, July 2024

Sika International AG’s acquisition of LSF11 Skyscraper Holdco was implemented in May 2023, including through their Kenyan subsidiaries (Sika Kenya and Master Builders Solutions Kenya), without CAK approval. CAK imposed a penalty of about KES 17.5 million before approving the merger. Commentary on the case reports that the parties raised the lapse themselves and were treated as first-time offenders. Two lessons: a Kenyan subsidiary alone can trigger a Kenyan filing, wherever the deal is signed; and cooperation reduces the penalty but does not remove it.

Chapter VI

COMESA and the EAC

Kenya belongs to both COMESA and the East African Community, and both now run mandatory, suspensory merger regimes on top of CAK’s. A deal with a regional footprint must be tested against all three.

National

CAK

Threshold
Combined KES 1bn in Kenya and a target above KES 500m (other tests apply)
Fee
Up to KES 4 million
Review
60 days from a complete filing
Regional

COMESA CCCC

Threshold
Combined USD 60m in COMESA, and at least two parties with USD 10m each
Fee
0.1% of combined COMESA turnover or assets, capped at USD 300,000
Review
120 days, with stop-the-clock powers
Regional

EACCA

Threshold
Combined USD 35m in the EAC, plus a USD 20m test for at least two parties
In force
1 November 2025
Carve-out
Each party has two-thirds of its EAC business in one Partner State

COMESA: the 2025 Regulations

The COMESA Council of Ministers adopted the COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations 2025 on 4 December 2025, in force from 5 December 2025. The regulator is now the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission (CCCC). The main changes:

  • Thresholds: combined COMESA turnover or assets of at least USD 60 million (up from USD 50 million), with at least two parties each at USD 10 million or more.
  • Digital deals: a USD 250 million transaction-value test where at least one party operates in two or more member states.
  • Fees: 0.1% of combined COMESA turnover or assets, capped at USD 300,000 (0.05% of transaction value for digital deals).
  • Suspensory: no implementation before clearance; gun-jumping can cost up to 10% of COMESA turnover.
  • Review and appeal: 120 days with stop-the-clock powers; appeals go to the COMESA Court of Justice within 45 days.

A COMESA filing does not always end the Kenyan question: under the Competition (General) Rules 2019 a deal that meets the COMESA thresholds must still be notified to CAK where two-thirds or more of the parties’ combined turnover or assets is in Kenya.

The East African Community Competition Authority

The East African Community Competition Authority (EACCA) operates under the EAC Competition Act, 2006 (amended in 2010 and 2023). By a General Notice of 1 July 2025 it made cross-border merger notification mandatory from 1 November 2025. A merger is notifiable where the parties’ combined turnover or assets in the Community is at least USD 35 million and a USD 20 million test is met by at least two of the parties. Whether that USD 20 million applies to each party or to the two parties together is not clear from the published drafting, so check it before relying on either reading. A deal is treated as domestic, not cross-border, where each party earns two-thirds of its Community turnover or assets in a single Partner State.

Not settled: one-stop shop or three filings?

EACCA describes itself as a one-stop shop: a merger notified to it need not go to national authorities. COMESA says the same of its own regime. EACCA has memoranda of understanding with CAK and, since 10 June 2025, with the CCCC, but neither allocates jurisdiction in a binding way, and Kenya’s own merger rules have not been amended to give way to EACCA. Practitioners advise that CAK may still expect a local filing and that dual COMESA and EAC filings remain a risk. As at 24 October 2026 we have found no formal clarification from CAK or EACCA. Test every regime separately and confirm the position with the authorities before relying on a single filing.

Chapter VII

The Amendment Bill

The Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026 (National Assembly Bill No. 4 of 2026) was published in Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 17 on 19 February 2026, after a CAK consultation on an earlier draft in mid-2024.

DateStage
19 Feb 2026Published as National Assembly Bill No. 4 of 2026
30 Jun 2026Second Reading debate opened
12 Aug 2026Report of the Departmental Committee on Finance and National Planning
3 Nov 2026 (tentative)Committee of the Whole House, per the Supplementary Order Paper of 22 October 2026

It is not law yet: there has been no Third Reading or assent. Its headline proposals are aimed at digital markets:

  • Strategic market position: CAK could treat a digital platform as holding market power below the 40% dominance threshold, looking at data, network effects, switching costs and how far users depend on it.
  • Superior bargaining position: scrutiny of commercial relationships where one side can set the terms because the other has no real alternative, such as platform and merchant, or platform and driver.
If you run a platform

Marketplaces, fintech, digital lending and gig platforms with Kenyan users should assess their exposure under both proposed tests now, rather than after enactment. We will update this chapter when the Bill moves.

Chapter VIII

Consumer protection

Consumer protection sits in two statutes with two institutional homes, and neither Act sets out a formal mechanism for coordinating them.

Competition Act, Part VIConsumer Protection Act, 2012
Enforced byCompetition Authority of KenyaCabinet Secretary for trade, advised by the Kenya Consumers Protection Advisory Committee
CoversFalse or misleading representations, unconscionable conduct, unsafe or defective goods (sections 55 to 70)Consumer rights, consumer agreements and credit
Main routeCAK investigation and administrative actionCourt action by consumers (section 84)

The same marketing claim or standard term can attract both regimes at once, through different bodies. Clearance by one does not answer the other. Consumer-facing financial services and digital lending have become a particular focus of CAK’s Part VI work.

Chapter IX

A compliance programme

A Kenya-specific programme should go beyond generic global antitrust training. Its core elements:

Merger protocol

  • Competition counsel signs off before any deal involving a Kenyan target, subsidiary, joint venture or asset is signed or closed, wherever it is negotiated.
  • A written threshold screen for CAK, COMESA and EACCA on every such deal.
  • Clearance as a condition precedent, or a Kenyan carve-out from closing.

Cartel controls

  • Rules for contact with competitors, trade association meetings and information exchange, with legal review before any discussion of prices, capacity or tenders.
  • Document retention aligned to how far back a CAK investigation can reach.
  • An escalate-at-once rule, because of the Leniency Programme: the first undertaking to report a cartel can obtain full immunity from fines; later applicants can obtain reductions of up to 50%, then up to 30%, then up to 20% for any subsequent applicant.

Dominance and buyer power

  • Above 40% in any Kenyan market: a standing review of pricing, exclusivity and refusals to supply against section 24.
  • Strong bargaining position over smaller suppliers: payment terms, termination rights and cost-shifting clauses reviewed against section 24A, with late-payment interest written in.

Self-reporting and settlement

  • A pre-agreed framework for deciding whether and how fast to self-report a gap to CAK.
  • Familiarity with section 38 settlement under CAK’s remedies and settlement guidelines: a 14-day window for a settlement proposal, a 7-day reply, a 14-day counter-proposal and 90 days of negotiation, extendable by 30 days.

Digital and platform businesses

  • Track the Amendment Bill (Chapter VII) and assess exposure under its proposed digital tests now.
  • Review consumer-facing disclosures and standard terms against Part VI, not only sector rules.
Chapter X

Deal checklist

A sequential checklist for any transaction that touches Kenya.

  1. Map every Kenyan link

    A Kenyan subsidiary, branch, revenue stream or asset can trigger a filing even if the deal is signed and closed abroad.

  2. Test CAK’s thresholds

    Combined Kenyan turnover or assets of at least KES 1 billion with a target above KES 500 million; or an acquirer above KES 10 billion where the parties are in the same or a vertically linked market. Between KES 500 million and KES 1 billion, apply for an exclusion.

  3. Test COMESA separately

    If any party operates in other COMESA states: combined USD 60 million with two parties at USD 10 million each, or the USD 250 million digital test.

  4. Test the EAC separately

    If any party operates in other EAC states: combined USD 35 million plus the USD 20 million test, subject to the two-thirds single-state carve-out.

  5. Do not assume a one-stop shop

    Record a separate threshold analysis for each regime and, where more than one is engaged, confirm the position with the authorities before relying on a single filing.

  6. Build clearance into the documents

    Make each required clearance a condition precedent, or at least a condition to any integration step in Kenya.

  7. Prepare the filing early

    Constitutional documents, accounts, the transaction agreement, market share and competitor data, and group charts, ready well before the target filing date.

  8. Budget for every fee

    CAK: from no fee to KES 4 million, depending on size. COMESA: 0.1% of combined turnover or assets, capped at USD 300,000. Add EACCA fees where it applies.

  9. If a gap appears after closing, escalate at once

    Early, cooperative self-reporting is treated as a mitigating factor, though it does not avoid a penalty.

  10. Check consumer-facing conduct twice

    Marketing claims, standard terms and safety statements against both Part VI of the Competition Act and the Consumer Protection Act.

Questions

Frequently asked

It can. If the deal gives the buyer control over a Kenyan business and the thresholds are met, it must be approved before anything is implemented in Kenya, wherever it is signed or closed. The Sika case turned on exactly that.

Under the Competition (General) Rules 2019: combined Kenyan turnover or assets of at least KES 1 billion and a target above KES 500 million, or an acquirer above KES 10 billion in the same or a vertically linked market. Deals between KES 500 million and KES 1 billion need an exclusion application. Older guidelines quoting a KES 100 million target are out of date.

Not reliably. Both regional bodies describe themselves as one-stop shops, but Kenyan law still pulls a COMESA deal back to CAK where two-thirds of the business is in Kenya, and the EAC position has not been formally settled. Test each regime separately.

Only by carving the Kenyan business out of closing until CAK approves, with no integration in Kenya in the meantime. Otherwise the deal is implemented without approval, which is an offence.

Sixty days from a complete notification. If CAK asks for more information, which it must do within 30 days, the 60 days run again from your reply. Exclusion applications take 14 days.

No. As at 24 October 2026 it awaits the Committee of the Whole House, tentatively listed for 3 November 2026. It has not had a Third Reading or assent.

Sources

Sources

Primary sources first. Press and law firm commentary is marked as such and used only where no primary text was available.

  1. Competition Act No. 12 of 2010, sections 21, 23, 24, 24A, 36, 41, 42 and Part VI (sections 55 to 70A)Primary
  2. Competition (General) Rules 2019 (L.N. 176 of 2019), Schedule, paragraph 4 (thresholds and exclusions)Primary
  3. Competition Authority of Kenya, merger filing feesPrimary
  4. Competition Authority of Kenya, mergers and acquisitions: process and timelinesPrimary
  5. CAK Leniency Programme GuidelinesPrimary
  6. CAK Consolidated Administrative Remedies and Settlement Guidelines 2023Primary
  7. CAK Annual Report and Financial Statements 2024/25 (July 2026)Primary
  8. COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission, adoption of the 2025 Regulations (8 December 2025)Primary
  9. COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations 2025Primary
  10. National Assembly, Supplementary Order Paper, 22 October 2026 (Competition (Amendment) Bill)Primary
  11. Consumer Protection Act No. 46 of 2012Primary
  12. Capital FM, Sika International fined for merger without CAK approval (July 2024)Press
  13. Capital FM, CAK fines Directline for abuse of buyer power (December 2025)Press
  14. Techweez, Airtel loses tariff fight as CAK clears Safaricom pricing (17 July 2026)Press
  15. CM Advocates, COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations 2025: launch in LivingstoneLaw firm
  16. LEX Africa, the EACCA merger notification regime (October 2025)Law firm
  17. Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, EACCA notifications: key nuances and practical risks (3 December 2025)Law firm
  18. ENS, Kenya: competition law in motion (Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026)Law firm

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Clay Odari

Lead Counsel, Clay & Associates Advocates

Advises local and foreign clients on merger notifications to CAK, COMESA and the EAC, abuse of dominance and buyer power complaints, and competition compliance programmes. This guide is general information, not legal advice on any particular transaction.

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